The U.S. Navy’s unmanned surface vessel (USV) push is increasingly central to how it plans to fight, especially after the decision to cancel most of the Constellation-class frigate program and rethink “small surface combatants.” In that re-write, USVs—particularly the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) family—are the cheapest, fastest way to add magazine depth and hull numbers without waiting a decade for new destroyers.

What the Navy actually wants from USVs

Current plans center on consolidating the Medium and Large USV programs into a single “family” of unmanned ships sized somewhere in the 200–300 ft range and about 1,000–2,000 tons displacement. 

Key traits:

Commercial-style hulls (offshore supply vessel type) to keep cost and build time down.  Modular, containerized payloads—most importantly vertical launch cells or other missile canisters.  Long endurance and simple, robust propulsion for Pacific ranges. No accommodations, survivability, or complex sensors at Burke levels—this is “magazine ship,” not mini-destroyer.

Concept art and studies typically assume something like 32 VLS cells per LUSV as an adjunct magazine riding with a carrier or destroyer group. 

How fast can production be rolled out?

Compared to a Burke or even a frigate, these hulls are simple. That’s deliberate: the Navy wants a non-exquisite design that many yards can build, using commercial standards and practices. 

Prototype / lead ships (now through ~2027) The Navy has been running autonomy and C2 testing with prototypes like Sea Hunter, Seahawk, Ranger, and Mariner under Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One.  GAO reporting says the Navy aims to consolidate and start development of the new combined USV type by 2027.  Initial production (late 2020s) Congressional reports and budget docs envision one LUSV in FY25, two in FY26, then three per year in FY27–28.  That’s 9–10 hulls over about four years, roughly equivalent in tonnage to 2–3 destroyers but spread across multiple shipyards. Industrial-base surge (early 2030s) Because these ships use commercial-type hulls, the Navy’s own planning assumes they can be built at multiple commercial or second-tier yards, instead of only at the two big destroyer yards.  Once the design is stable, nothing stops the Navy from pushing to 5–8 USVs per year across the national shipyard base—especially if they accept a relatively bare-bones combat system and focus on being a “floating missile truck.”

The big gating factor isn’t steel—it’s software, autonomy, weapons integration, and congressional comfort. Technically, the hulls themselves could be stamped out on timelines closer to offshore supply vessels: on the order of two years from start to delivery, versus 5–7 years for a Burke.

Magazine depth: how many USVs do you actually need?

A Flight III Burke carries 96 VLS cells. An LUSV with 32 cells is effectively one-third of a destroyer’s magazine.

As a rule of thumb, 3 LUSVs ≈ 1 Burke’s worth of extra VLS. A carrier strike group with 2–3 Burkes and 4–6 USVs could effectively double its missile inventory without adding manned hulls.

How do these vessels slot in with the existing fleet? For a major war in the Pacific, one could imagine 6–8 CSG/ESG-scale formations forward, each backed by 4–6 USVs; You’re quickly in the realm of 24–48 LUSVs total, plus some attrition reserve.

That’s very much in line with think-tank and CRS-type ranges for a “meaningful” unmanned adjunct force, and matches the trajectory implied by current budget planning (low double-digits of LUSVs over the FYDP, then growth). 

Cost and value proposition

CRS and other analyses put LUSV unit cost around $250M per hull in FY24–25 dollars.  That’s roughly one-third the cost of a Flight III Burke, and possibly less than half when you factor in lifecycle personnel costs, because there’s no crew. For the price of one destroyer, you could realistically buy 3–4 USVs and add on the order of one full Burke’s worth of VLS to the fleet’s forward posture, scattered across multiple formations.

There are tradeoffs: USVs are less survivable, easier to jam, and bring less organic sensing. But if your tactical concept is “distributed fires from many nodes,” they’re a very cost-effective way to thicken the salvos.

How many units, at scale?

If you sketch a 2035-ish target for a serious unmanned complement:

Low end: 20–25 USVs Enough to attach 2–3 to most deployed carrier and amphib groups. Middle (more realistic war-planning): 35–50 Gives surge depth, training / test assets, and attrition reserve. High ambition: 60+ Begins to fundamentally change how the fleet fights, with unmanned magazines basically shadowing every major strike group and some independent surface action groups.

At $250M each, a 40-ship USV fleet is about $10B in procurement spread over a decade—well within normal Navy budget swings, especially if offset by cuts in more exquisite manned hulls.

Could Wisconsin shipyards build them?

Short answer: yes, technically—and the politics now point that way.

Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Wisconsin was the prime yard for the now-canceled Constellation-class frigates.  After the cancellation, both Navy and Fincantieri statements emphasize refocusing the yard on “small surface combatants,” including manned or unmanned segments.  Marinette has just invested heavily in facilities, workforce, and modernization to handle complex combatant work, which is more demanding than a commercial-standard USV hull.

From an industrial-base perspective:

Facilities: Covered construction halls, new lifts, and finishing piers sized for a 7,000-ton frigate are more than adequate for a 1,500-ton USV. Workforce: The existing skilled workforce now faces a demand gap after the frigate cuts; pivoting to USVs would keep welders, fitters, and engineers employed on Navy work. Design: If the LUSV or follow-on USV uses a commercial-inspired hull, Marinette can either partner with a Gulf Coast commercial yard (as Blue Water did with Conrad Shipyard in Louisiana) or take on full-rate production itself. 

There’s also a clear strategic logic for the Navy:

Spread the work: Right now, most combatant construction is concentrated at a handful of yards. Pushing USV production to Wisconsin adds resilience. Mitigate the political hit: Wisconsin just lost multiple frigate hulls; substituting a multi-decade line of USVs softens that blow. Match yard to mission: Marinette’s experience on Littoral Combat Ship and Constellation gives it a solid base in small combatants and modular mission packages—exactly what USVs need.

If the Navy really decided to lean in, you could imagine a future where:

The baseline USV hull and machinery is built in Wisconsin (and possibly other yards), Then final systems integration (launchers, communications, autonomy packages) is done either at the same yard or at specialized Navy facilities.

On that model, Marinette could probably turn out 2–3 USVs per year once the line is hot—enough to be a major contributor to a 5–8 hull per-year national buy

The USV should be a top priority for the Nation, as additional magazine depth is critical. Additionally the Navy has had a troubling difficulty in launching new manned programs. Starting to replace the Navy’s Ticonderoga class is realistically decades out. As each Tico is retired- 120 missile tubes are lost. The Flag capabilities can be replaced by Flight 3 Arleigh Burke class destroyers- but the trade off is 40 missile tubes. The USV’s can help offset this crucial loss.

The Marinette Marine ship yard is vital to our national defense posture. Starting USV production there should be a major goal for the Navy. It’s not just good for the Midwest. It’s what’s best for the nation.

Bibliography

Congressional Research Service. Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Updated January 2024. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Congressional Research Service. Navy DDG-51 and DDG(X) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress. Updated December 2024. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Congressional Research Service. Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress. Updated February 2025. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Fincantieri Marine Group. “Statement on Navy Contract Adjustments and Future Small Combatant Production.” Press release, July 2024.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Challenges in Developing Autonomy and Unmanned Platforms. GAO-23-106197. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2023.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). Navy Shipbuilding: Ongoing Challenges in Meeting Cost and Schedule Goals. GAO-24-105983. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2024.

Larter, David. “U.S. Navy Consolidates Large and Medium USV Programs into Single Development Path.” Defense News, October 12, 2024.

O’Rourke, Ronald. “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Congressional Issues.” Congressional Research Service, updated 2024.

U.S. Navy. Unmanned Campaign Framework. Department of the Navy, March 2021.

U.S. Navy. “Navy Budget Justification Documents: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, FY2025 – Program Elements for Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV).” Department of the Navy, 2024.

U.S. Navy Program Executive Office, Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC). “USV Division One Test Operations Overview.” Navy briefing document, 2024.

Watson, Ben. “Navy Looks to Commercial Hulls for New Unmanned Missile Ships.” Breaking Defense, May 2024.

Werner, Ben. “Navy’s Ranger, Mariner, and Sea Hunter Advance Fleet Autonomy Testing.” USNI News, June 2024.

Werner, Ben. “Navy Eyes 32-Cell Missile Load for Future LUSV Design.” USNI News, February 2025.