Why the U.S. Navy Has Struggled to Roll Out New Ship Classes — And How to Fix It

For the better part of two decades, the U.S. Navy has faced well-documented difficulties in fielding new surface combatants. From the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to the Zumwalt-class destroyer and now the cancelled Constellation-class frigate, the pattern is consistent: ambitious concepts, immature technologies, cost overruns, and shifting strategic requirements. These challenges have slowed modernization at a time when the Navy confronts rapid Chinese naval expansion and demands for a more distributed force. Understanding why these problems occur—and how the Navy can avoid repeating them in programs like DDG(X)—is central to restoring American shipbuilding credibility.

1. The Legacy of Over-Ambition: The LCS

The Littoral Combat Ship began as a fast, modular, highly flexible vessel intended for shallow-water operations, mine countermeasures, and swarm defense. In practice, it became the case study in program misalignment.

First, the LCS hinged on the concept of interchangeable mission modules, many of which never matured. Without reliable modules, the ship could not perform two of its three planned mission sets. Second, its lightweight design compromised survivability—acceptable for a niche vessel but problematic once the Navy tried to use the LCS as a multi-mission combatant. Third, the “two-variant” decision (Freedom and Independence classes) doubled logistics burdens.

The LCS was a step toward a nimble fleet but ultimately demonstrated the danger of fielding a platform before its critical systems have been proven.

2. The Zumwalt-Class: Technology Risk Meets Budget Reality

The Zumwalt-class destroyer represented a technological moonshot: radar-evading tumblehome hulls, integrated power systems, and a long-range gun that relied on ammunition so expensive that the Navy canceled it. The result was a destroyer without a working primary weapon.

The Zumwalt’s problems stemmed from overly aggressive concurrency—designing, building, and experimenting all at once. When the advanced gun failed to meet cost goals, the Navy could not justify procurement beyond three hulls. The class now serves mainly as a testbed for hypersonic missiles and next-generation power systems. While this may prove useful, the program did not deliver the operational impact originally envisioned.

3. The Constellation-Class: A More Cautious Approach Still Fails

Learning from earlier missteps, the Navy attempted a low-risk path for its new guided-missile frigate: start with a proven foreign design (the Italian FREMM), modify it minimally, and emphasize traditional naval attributes—range, survivability, and sensor power.

Yet even this “safer” program failed. Naval Sea Systems Command has cited supply-chain stresses, workforce shortages at shipyards, and underestimation of how long it takes to translate successful foreign designs into American industrial conditions. The Constellation program has now been reduced to a class of two ships.

This failure highlights a key truth: even conservative designs are vulnerable when the industrial base is strained.

4. Root Causes Across All Programs

Across these cases, several systemic issues emerge:

a. Immature Technology

Programs often rely on technologies not yet ready for production. When those technologies fail to mature on time—whether mission modules, power distribution systems, sensors, or weapons—the ship cannot fulfill its role.

b. Overlapping Development and Construction

Concurrency speeds innovation on paper but transfers engineering risk directly onto the shipbuilder. When major components change mid-construction, delays and cost overruns explode.

c. Shrinking Industrial Base

The U.S. shipbuilding workforce is far smaller than during the Cold War. Complex ships require highly specialized labor, and shortages drive both slower production and higher costs. Shipyards also lack redundancy-if one facility experiences problems, the Navy has no fallback.

d. Constant Strategic Shifts

Navy requirements evolve based on global threats, shifting political priorities, or budget fluctuations. When requirements shift mid-program, previously stable designs become unstable.

5. Solutions for Future Programs

Solution 1: Technology Maturity Before Construction

No ship should enter construction unless critical systems are at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7 or higher, meaning tested in conditions resembling operational use. This reduces redesign cycles and prevents LCS- or Zumwalt-like system failures.

Solution 2: Modular, Open Architecture—but Realistically

Modularity is still valuable, but it must be based on technologies already proven. Future ships should use open software and hardware architecture so new sensors or weapons integrate without redesigning the ship.

Solution 3: Strengthen the Industrial Base

Congress and the Navy can take several steps:

• Multi-year procurement contracts to stabilize workforce planning
• Investment in shipyard modernization (automation, digital engineering, AI-assisted design)
• Apprenticeship pipelines with trade schools and technical colleges

Without industrial revitalization, even perfect designs will be delivered late.

Solution 4: Incremental Design Philosophy

Rather than fielding revolutionary platforms, the Navy should pursue evolutionary upgrades. The Arleigh Burke class, despite its age, remains successful because it has evolved incrementally through Flight IIA and Flight III designs.

Solution 5: Clear, Stable Requirements

Congress, DoD, and the Navy must resist the temptation to bolt on capabilities mid-program. Requirements volatility has killed more ship schedules than enemy missiles ever will.

6. Implications for DDG(X)

DDG(X), the Navy’s planned next-generation destroyer, is intended to replace Burke-class ships in the 2030s. It will emphasize power generation for directed-energy weapons, enhanced sensors, and long-range strike.

To avoid repeating past failures, DDG(X) must adhere to several guardrails:

1. Prove the integrated power system before keel-laying.
2. Avoid concurrency: freeze the design before construction begins.
3. Adopt scalable design architecture so early ships can evolve with new technologies.
4. Ensure multiple shipyards can build the class to avoid bottlenecks.

If these lessons are applied, DDG(X) may break the Navy’s streak of troubled ship introductions.

Bibliography

Books and Reports

• O’Rourke, Ronald. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2024.
• Work, Robert O., and Greg Grant. Beating the Booz Allen Curve: Reforming Defense Technology Acquisition. Center for a New American Security, 2020.

Articles and Analyses

• Freedberg, Sydney J. “Why LCS Failed Its Mission.” Breaking Defense, March 2019.
• LaGrone, Sam. “Navy: Constellation-Class Frigate Construction Slower Than Expected.” USNI News, 2024.
• Eckstein, Megan. “Zumwalt’s Legacy: Lessons from a Failed Destroyer.” Defense News, 2021.
• Cancian, Mark. “The Navy’s Shipbuilding Crisis.” CSIS Naval Analysis Review, 2023.

Government Sources

• Naval Sea Systems Command. Program Executive Office Shipbuilding Annual Report. U.S. Navy, 2023.
• U.S. Government Accountability Office. Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Challenges in Cost and Schedule, GAO-24-105432, 2024.